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Consensus, Polarization, and Alignment in the
Economics Profession
Tod S. Van Gunten,a John Levi Martin,b Misha Teplitskiyc
a) Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies; b) University of Chicago; c) Harvard University
Abstract: Scholars interested in the political influence of the economics profession debate whether
the discipline is unified by policy consensus or divided among competing schools or factions. We
address this question by reanalyzing a unique recent survey of elite economists. We present a
theoretical framework based on a formal sociological approach to the structure of belief systems
and propose alignment, rather than consensus or polarization, as a model for the structure of belief
in the economics profession. Moreover, we argue that social clustering in a heterogeneous network
topology is a better model for disciplinary social structure than discrete factionalization. Results show
that there is a robust latent ideological dimension related to economists’ departmental affiliations
and political partisanship. Furthermore, we show that economists closer to one another in informal
social networks also share more similar ideologies.
Keywords: profession; polarization; sociology of economics; ideology; networks
SOCIOLOGY has recently seen a growing empirical literature on the social andpolitical influence of the economics profession (Fourcade et al. 2015; Hirschman
and Berman 2014; Reay 2012; Van Gunten 2015). Uniquely among the social sciences,
contemporary U.S. economics enjoys consensus on a core paradigm based on
formal models of individual rationality and collective equilibrium; according to
advocates, this approach earns the attention of policy makers by virtue of its ability
to formulate “clear, unambiguous policy statements” (Lazear 2000:102). Some
sociologists argue that these policy statements have substantial practical impact,
particularly as the discipline’s increasing emphasis on market efficiency “provided
part of the intellectual rationale for the deregulatory movement in public policy and
the expanded use of the price and market mechanism” (Fourcade et al. 2015:105) in
a variety of policy areas (c.f. Babb 2001; Blyth 2002; Campbell 1998; Chwieroth 2007;
Kogut and Macpherson 2007). However, as Reay (2012:46) argues, this literature
has produced something of a paradox: although many studies see the profession
as a powerful, unified juggernaut, others (including many economists themselves)
view the discipline as fragmented and weak. Against the image of economics
as a homogeneous advocate of “neoliberal” policies, some economists view their
profession as polarized among competing schools or “factions” divided over beliefs
about the proper balance of free markets and state intervention (Krugman 2009).
Thus, whether paradigmatic consensus is sufficient to generate policy consensus or
compatible with ideological division remains an open empirical question.
An observable corollary of this question is whether the “idea space” of main-
stream professional economics is constrained (Converse 1964; Martin 2002), such
that it is possible to identify an ideological dimension running from advocates
of the “free market” to those more amenable to government intervention. In this
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article, we use a survey of elite economists to show that an important subset of
economists’ policy beliefs do align in this fashion. By “ideology,” we refer to the
substantive content of these beliefs, which reflects the classic debate between state
intervention and free markets.1 Our focus on alignment addresses a failure to
explicitly define terms such as “polarization” and “faction” in recent debates and,
more generally, to place these concepts in the context of a systematic approach to
the formal properties of belief systems (Mohr 1998). We argue that factionalism—in
the sense of discrete and mutually exclusive group memberships—is a poor model
for the economics discipline. Rather, we conceptualize the social structure of the
discipline as a heterogeneous topology characterized by informal “communities,”
or clustering in professional networks. We show that economists with more similar
social networks—those that tend to coauthor with the same colleagues—are closer
together in ideological space. These findings support an alignment model of the
economics profession according to which the field is neither polarized nor fully
unified but rather partially structured around the “state versus market” ideological
divide.
We support these claims by reanalyzing a recent survey of 51 elite economists
in the United States conducted by the Initiative for Global Markets (IGM) at the
University of Chicago since 2011. Despite a small, nonrandom sample and other
limitations discussed below, the IGM survey has unique features that make it a
valuable resource for studying the economics profession. In particular, because
responses are public, it is possible to incorporate data on respondents’ careers, po-
litical activities, and social networks from outside the survey itself. In addition, the
IGM survey has already been the object of substantial research (Gordon and Dahl
2013; Sapienza and Zingales 2013) and public discussion (Krugman 2013; Smith
2013), making further analysis valuable insofar as it extends and qualifies previous
results. Existing analyses of these data report “no evidence to support a conserva-
tive versus liberal divide” among respondents (Gordon and Dahl 2013:635). In
contrast, we identify a latent ideological dimension clearly related to contemporary
political debates and, more importantly, show that ideological distance between
economists is related to partisan and departmental affiliations—as well as to the
similarity of respondents’ informal social networks.
Our results suggest that paradigmatic consensus does not eliminate ideological
heterogeneity in the case of the economics profession. Although there is indeed
substantial consensus in the profession, we show that consensus and ideological
alignment are not mutually exclusive. However, depictions of the economics disci-
pline as polarized or factionalized overstate the degree of intra-professional conflict;
our alignment model provides a better fit to the data and clarifies a debate that
itself threatens to become excessively polarized. Thus, our findings qualify both
sociological literature that depicts a pro-market consensus and recent arguments
that there is no systematic ideological heterogeneity in the economics profession.
Moreover, we tentatively interpret our finding of an association between network
similarity and ideological proximity as evidence of homophily in coauthorship
selection (and possibly self-reinforcing belief formation processes), suggesting that
ideology influences not just in hiring processes and political activities but also the
research process itself.
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Consensus and Conflict in the Economics Profession
The notion of economics as a polarized or factionalized field has its roots in deep
professional debates during the 1970s. Aided by the economic crisis of stagflation,
a professional movement associated with monetarism and the “New Classical”
economics succeeded in calling into question the hitherto dominant Keynesian
approach (Van Gunten 2015). The labels “freshwater” and “saltwater” (Hall 1976)
have come to describe the competing classical, laissez-faire approach associated
with the University of Chicago and other Midwestern economics departments,
as compared to the more Keynesian economics practiced in coastal universities
such as Harvard and MIT. For example, Krugman (2009) describes an economic
field “divided into two great factions”: “saltwater” economists with a “more or
less Keynesian vision of what recessions are all about” and a “freshwater” camp of
“neoclassical purists.”
On the other hand, many economists argue that the paradigmatic debates of
the 1970s have largely been resolved, giving rise to a New Keynesian “consen-
sus” (Blanchard 2009; Blinder 1997). Moreover, the disciplinary feud of the 1970s
occurred mainly within the subfield of macroeconomics; microeconomics was ar-
guably less affected. Sociologists and political scientists studying the economics
profession and its political influence also observe policy consensus, though they
tend to emphasize the “neoclassical” or “neoliberal” orientation of the contempo-
rary field (Babb 2001; Blyth 2002; Chwieroth 2007; Kogut and Macpherson 2007).
At the paradigmatic level, relative to other social sciences, economists agree more
on standards of research quality and see their field as independent of politics (La-
mont 2009; Fourcade et al. 2015); moreover, U.S. economists tend to show greater
consensus than those in other countries (Fourcade 2009). Similarly, survey research
on the economics profession has generally argued that there is a broad consensus
within the mainstream (Alston et al. 1992; Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2003).2
Recent research using the data analyzed in this article mirrors this broader de-
bate. As noted above, one widely discussed paper (Gordon and Dahl 2013) argues
that the IGM survey provides strong evidence of professional consensus and the
absence of discernible ideology; public discussion has tended to echo this conclu-
sion (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers 2012). However, some analyses report significant
correlations between ideology measures and responses on some politically salient
items (Wolfers 2013; Sapienza and Zingales 2013). Similarly, Jelveh et al. (2014) use
automated text analysis to detect latent ideology in published economics research
and validate their algorithm using these items. However, the claim of Gordon and
Dahl (2013) is that the IGM data show aggregate consensus in the belief system of
professional economists rather than the (undisputed) point that there is consensus
on certain beliefs. Below, we argue that this recent literature has not full recognized
the difficulty of quantifying professional consensus; nor have previous studies fully
explored latent ideology in the IGM data using appropriate methods.
Debates over whether the economics profession is unified or fragmented suffer
from two related theoretical weaknesses. First, these debates lack explicit definitions
of terms such as “consensus” and “polarization” and, more generally, grounding in a
systematic approach to the formal properties of belief systems. Second, studies have
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explored a relatively limited range of links between professional belief and formal
affiliations, such as partisan activities and departmental training or employment
(Gordon and Dahl 2013; Sapienza and Zingales 2013). In addition to such affiliation
variables, we suggest a focus on informal social structures, such as collaboration
networks.
Formal Properties of Belief Systems
To remedy the first deficiency, we draw on sociological discussions of the formal
properties of belief systems (for a review, see Mohr 1998). Much of this work begins
with the notion of “constraint” as formulated by Converse (1964). In this tradition,
we begin by conceptualizing the structure of belief in the economics profession
as a generic “idea space” with as many dimensions as there are measured items.
Thus we have N people (in this case “mainstream” economists) distributed in an
M-dimensional space. In the absence of any systematic structure or “constraint,”
we would expect to see the individuals evenly distributed like gas molecules in an
M-dimensional box. The deviation of the observed distribution from this extreme
may be of two types (Martin 2002). We define ”consensus” as gross agreement
at the level of the marginals, or a low variance in the distribution along particular
beliefs. On the other hand, ”tightness” refers to the association of multiple beliefs
with one another, even in the presence of disagreement.
An important difficulty in measuring aggregate consensus is that any assess-
ment inevitably depends on the corpus of measured beliefs. Relative claims about
consensus are straightforward: we can easily compare the distributions of two
or more groups in the same belief space (or a single group over time). Thus, in
Figure 1A, the group denoted by the black circles clearly has higher consensus than
that denoted by the open circles (there are the same number of observations in
each). But considered by itself, it is impossible to say anything precise about the
consensus of a single group other than that it is total or non-total. Short of finding
total homogeneity, our measure of consensus will largely be a function of whether
or not we have asked about controversial issues. If one measures “core” beliefs that
define group membership, one will unsurprisingly find high consensus; conversely,
if one measures beliefs that are contested within group boundaries, consensus will
appear lower. Below, we suggest that this issue is an important limitation of the
IGM data. Hence, in this article, we bracket the question of measuring consensus
and instead focus on the observed structure of the variation beyond the marginals.
The alternative to consensus is often expressed as the hypothesis that the field
is “polarized” (Gordon and Dahl 2013:630) or “divided into two great factions”
(Krugman 2009). These hypotheses require additional elaboration, because polar-
ization is a multidimensional phenomenon (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Baldassari and
Gelman 2008; Flache and Macy 2011). The most common conception of polarization
is a bimodal distribution with high variance and empty center, as illustrated in
Figure 1B. Such a distribution is intuitive, as it collapses quantitative patterns to
a qualitative distinction between groups, as implied by a term such as “faction.”
However, notwithstanding language such as “warring camps,” “polarization,” and
“faction,” we suspect that few observers truly believe that the field is divided among
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Figure 1: Hypothetical idea spaces.
fundamentally unreconciled groups with antithetical beliefs. Nor, as we show
below, do our data suggest that economics is polarized in this sense. We suggest
that ”tightness,”as defined above, is a better model for the ideological heterogeneity
of the economics profession.
To illustrate, note that in Figure 1B, although it is epiphenomenal, there is a high
correlation between the two belief dimensions.3 It is possible for such a correlation
to exist in the absence of polarization, as in Figure 1C. This “tightness” of this idea
sociological science | www.sociologicalscience.com 1032 December 2016 | Volume 3
Van Gunten, Martin, and Teplitskiy Consensus and Alignment
space suggests alignment but not polarization in the sense of a bimodal distribution
or missing middle. Such an idea space includes a clear “center” but nevertheless
implies that, in the aggregate, certain beliefs tend to be correlated. In contrast to
the difficulty of measuring consensus in a single group, it is possible to assess the
extent of alignment or tightness without comparative data.
This model also helps illustrate the implications of an important variant of the
consensus hypothesis. Recognizing that, in the aggregate, professional consensus is
not total, Gordon and Dahl (2013:630) suggest that deviations from the mean in the
IGM panel are “idiosyncratic” random individual effects and not evidence of some
sort of stable difference of opinion that might indicate ideological heterogeneity In
other words, to the extent that consensus falls short of total agreement, heterogeneity
in belief is “white noise”; on this view, all constraint in the IGM data takes the
form of consensus rather than alignment. We refer to this joint null hypothesis—
that professional opinion is a combination of consensus and random variation—as
“consensus + noise.” Any observation of tightness in a belief distribution falsifies
the “noise” proviso of this null hypothesis to the extent that the idea space has more
structure than would be expected by chance. We refer to this alternative hypothesis
as “consensus + alignment.”
Note that in Figure 1A, we may tilt the space so that all the variation is on a
single dimension. This sort of successful dimensional reduction is a good way of
examining one very common form of tightness—linear associations due to common
factors. Given that we do not expect to observe polarization in the bimodal sense
(and preliminary analysis did not support the polarization hypothesis), but we
do expect alignment, we use such dimensional reduction to explore the logic of
the organization of the belief space of economists. In particular, we use principal
components analysis (PCA), a widely used and mathematically straightforward
form of factor analysis capable of distinguishing either polarization or alignment
from noise. By analyzing the substantive content of the survey items that load on
the dimension revealed by the analysis, we can retrieve the latent content of this
belief structure and interpret its meaning.
From Idea Space to Social Structure
References to the freshwater/saltwater divide as professional “factionalism” imply
that disagreements in economics are rooted in disciplinary social structures. In soci-
ological terms, concepts such as “school,” “camp,” and “faction” imply relatively
stable patterns of interaction, identification, and group formation. For example,
the “freshwater/saltwater” distinction implies a field structured at least in part on
the basis of academic departments and, thus, on stable organizations, socialization
tendencies, and career mobility patterns. Departmental memberships may trans-
late into professional ideologies through socialization (when economists adopt the
“worldview” of the program in which they trained) or homophily (if departments
tend to hire like-minded colleagues). Consistent with the latter, Terviö (2011) finds
that hiring patterns in economics show greater clustering than other disciplines,
such as mathematics. To the extent that an economists’ position along a formal
belief dimension correlates with the distinction between departments typically
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classified “freshwater” or “saltwater,” there is further evidence that this dimension
reflects latent ideology as we have defined it. Moreover, the substantive content
of the free market/intervention in economics mirrors a familiar division between
the Republican and Democratic parties in the broader partisan arena. Correlation
between party affiliations and position on this dimension is therefore additional
evidence in favor of interpreting this dimension as ideological.
Nevertheless, an empirical demonstration that these formal affiliations are asso-
ciated with position on a belief dimension does not amount to evidence of profes-
sional “factionalism.” Rather, such a demonstration shows that there are differences,
on average, across departmental or partisan lines, but not that these differences coa-
lesce into discrete, mutually exclusive subgroups. Indeed, just as we have argued
that polarization is an unlikely model for the idea space of the economics discipline,
we also argue that factionalism in this sense is a poor description of the field’s social
structure. Rather, we propose that the economics field is structured by interaction
patterns that result in the emergence of fluid and informal professional communi-
ties or “invisible colleges” (Crane 1972), but not discrete factions. Sociologists of
science have long observed that networks of scientific interaction are heterogeneous
topologies characterized by substantial local clustering (Moody 2004). Two impor-
tant forms of interaction that can manifest such clustering are coauthorship and
citation networks; academics tend to select like-minded colleagues as coauthors and
signal affinity through citation (Schwed and Bearman 2010). Recent research in eco-
nomics supports these observations; Goyal et al. (2006) find that the coauthorship
network of economics has “small world” properties consistent with a fragmented
field (Moody 2004), and Önder and Terviö (2015) find clustered citation patterns
consistent with a freshwater/saltwater divide. From this perspective, economists
who share similar social networks are likely to also be closer in the discipline’s idea
space.
Thus, we model individual economists’ latent ideological positions—as inferred
from the PCA analysis—as a function of individual affiliations and other back-
ground characteristics, in particular whether respondents trained and work in
“freshwater” or “saltwater” departments and their affiliations with political parties,
if any. Furthermore, we then model the relational ideological distance between
pairs of respondents, adding measures of structural equivalence (Wasserman and
Faust 1994:347–391) in coauthor networks as predictors to examine whether re-
spondents closer in informal social networks also share more similar ideologies.
Though we do not attempt to disentangle the mechanisms that might produce this
relationship, our working hypothesis is that an association between network and
ideological similarity reflects a combination of homophily in coauthorship selection
and self-reinforcing feedback processes.
Data and Methods
The IGM economic experts panel is a survey of a total of 51 elite, mainstream
economists on nearly 200 policy-oriented questions conducted since 2011.4 Respon-
dents were selected from among senior faculty in the top seven U.S. economics
departments (Berkeley, Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale). The
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survey designers selected respondents to achieve diversity of geography, age, area
of expertise, and partisanship. Clearly, this is not a random sample, which limits
the extent to which this survey can be generalized to the economics profession as a
whole. For the purpose of demonstrating consensus in the economics profession,
this design limitation is a flaw. For example, professional belief may be more het-
erogeneous outside the top departments, although economists outside this elite are
likely no less knowledgeable. Thus, we restrict our conclusions to the mainstream
elite of the profession.
Just as the survey is not a random sample of economists, the composition of
survey items is problematic from the standpoint of quantifying consensus. Rather
than strictly test the hypothesis of professional consensus, the survey seems to have
been partially designed to “showcase consensus” (Wolfers 2013). For example, the
survey includes many didactic items that illustrate the implications of textbook
economics, such as the benefits free trade (3/13/12), the impossibility of predicting
the stock market (10/31/2011), the disadvantages of the gold standard (1/12/12)
and the state-controlled Cuban economy (5/15/12), and the proposition that vaccine
refusal imposes externalities (3/10/2015). Although these items usefully illustrate
mainstream professional opinion on particular issues, for the purposes of strictly
testing the hypothesis of aggregate consensus, these “softball” items have dubious
value, because few observers doubt that there is a consensus on such issues within
this mainstream. Had the survey included “heterodox” or “Austrian” economists,
it may have encountered a wider range of opinion. Overall, on 30 percent of items,
not a single respondent took a position opposite the modal view (i.e., agreed when
the modal position was disagree or vice versa). Whether this reflects the strength of
professional consensus or a survey biased towards “softball” questions is subjective.
Despite these limitations, the IGM survey is a valuable tool for studying the
structure of observed beliefs among elite, mainstream economists. Although the
survey includes many uncontroversial items, it also includes numerous items that
tap deep recent controversies. For example, the survey includes questions on the
financial crises and recession in the United States and Europe, the United Kingdom’s
exit from the European Union, the minimum wage, and the patent system. In some
cases, these items revealed substantial and nontrivial consensus. For example,
despite vigorous public debates, the overwhelming majority of respondents agreed
that that the Obama fiscal stimulus decreased the unemployment rate. Other items
reveal informative debates: for example, a second question on the stimulus package
reveals more debate (and more uncertainty) about the more difficult question of
whether the benefits of the stimulus exceeded the costs. Thus, the panel reveals
substantial variation in professional belief.
As noted above, we use PCA to infer respondents’ positions in the latent “idea
space.” Gordon and Dahl (2013) report failing to identify ideology in these data
using cluster analysis; however, this method is unlikely to recover alignment in the
sense introduced above. Our approach is to determine whether there is evidence
of a constrained (tight) belief structure, and, if so, how many dimensions this
space seems to have. We then are interested in whether we can predict individual
economists’ positions in this space. To the extent that we can, we must reject the
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hypothesis that there is no structuring to the disagreement in the field, that is, that
disagreement is simply “noise.”
Because PCA requires pairwise-complete observations across a large number
of survey items, attrition and nonresponse require careful treatment. The panel
initially included 41 participants; due to attrition, the panel was replenished with
10 additional respondents, for a total of 51 panel members. As Figure 2 illustrates,
this pattern results in two partially overlapping implicit survey waves; respondents
answered only first-wave items, only second-wave items, or both. Replenishment
participants also responded retroactively to a small number of items when they
joined the panel; these items are thus included in both waves.5 Our approach is to
use all available data while imposing a threshold for the minimum response rate
of 60 percent,6 excluding respondents that failed to meet this threshold in either
wave, and impute the mean for all remaining missing data. Mean imputation is
conservative in that it biases our findings towards finding no factor structure beyond
what would be expected under chance, given the distribution on the marginals.
Across the two waves, we are able to perform the PCA on 47 respondents.7
After presenting the results of the PCA, we use the respondent-level scores
inferred by this analysis in two ways. First, we regress individual-level scores on
respondent’s attributes (collected from their CVs), including their partisan and
departmental affiliations, age, gender, place of birth, areas of expertise, and work
experience outside academia (i.e., private sector and central banks). We capture
“left” and “right” partisan affiliations by combining government appointments
under Republican and Democratic administrations and affiliations with party-
aligned think tanks.8 Following Gordon and Dahl (2013) and Önder and Terviö
(2015), we code Harvard, MIT, Princeton, and Berkeley as “saltwater” departments
and Chicago, Stanford, and Yale as “freshwater” (comparison group).9 Moreover,
like Gordon and Dahl (2013), we use respondents’ National Bureau of Economic
research (NBER) memberships to measure their area of expertise.10
Second, we model the absolute difference in individual PCA scores between
pairs of respondents as a function of joint characteristics (i.e., common departments,
partisan leanings, and shared expertise) and the similarity of respondent’s positions
in the coauthorship network among respondents. In order to construct the latter,
we obtained each respondent’s unique coauthors from the publications listed in
their CV, cross-referenced shared coauthors, and defined the coauthorship network
as all IGM respondents plus all economists who authored a paper with more
than one respondent. We measure similarity using the structural equivalence of
the respondents’ coauthorship networks; our preferred equivalence measure is
the Jaccard similarity index, which is the proportion of coauthors of each pair of
respondents that are coauthors of both. To control for network size and varying
propensities to coauthor with other survey respondents, we include a two measures
of network size in our base network model. For reasons discussed in more detail
below, we control for both total joint degree (the geometric mean of the number of
coauthors in each dyad) and within-panel joint degree (the geometric mean of the
number of coauthors who are panel members).11
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Figure 2: Nonresponse, attrition, and implicit survey waves in the IGM panel. Note: Each point represents
a valid response; empty locations indicate nonresponse. Red points represent data analyzed as wave 1.
Green points represent data analyzed as wave 2. Blue points were used in both analyses. These items were
retroactively posed to the replenishment respondents when they joined the panel. Hollow points represent
valid data that could not be used due to an insufficient response rate within that wave. Respondents
positioned between the solid and dotted black lines were included in both waves (i.e., their latent ideology
is observed twice), unless the respondent did not maintain a 60 percent response rate. In July–September
2014, the panel “revisited” earlier items; items that replenishment respondents had already answered were
excluded.
Results
PCA reveals one primary dimension in the idea space of professional economists.
As Figure 3 shows, this first dimension explains about 10–12 percent of the variance,
while the variance explained by additional dimensions declines rapidly. In order to
test whether this fraction of variance could be explained by chance, we conducted a
permutation test;12 in 1,000 iterations, we never once achieved this level of explained
variance on the first PCA dimension in either wave. For the 31 respondents active
in both waves, we find a correlation of .85 between their individual-level scores
across waves, underscoring the robustness of this dimension. However, the cross-
wave correlation on the second dimension is low (.41), suggesting that PCA fails to
recover the same underlying dimension in the two waves. Moreover, although in
both waves the second PCA dimension explains a statistically significant fraction
of variance (according to our permutation test), the variance explained by the
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Figure 3: PCA: explained variance.
second dimension falls well within the range explained by chance on the first
dimension. This reduces our confidence that the second dimension is interpretable.
Thus, we are able to identify only one robust dimension in these data, although
we cannot conclusively establish that the idea space of the economics discipline is
one-dimensional.
Although the proportion of variance explained is not overwhelming, it repre-
sents a clear rejection of the “consensus + noise” null hypothesis (Gordon and
Dahl 2013). Moreover, a priori we do not expect all survey items to reflect the
same underlying dimension. If (as we show momentarily) the primary dimension
revealed by PCA reflects the ideologically freighted issue of state intervention in
the marketplace, we do not expect survey items that invoke issues are orthogonal,
obliquely related, or particularly nuanced to load on this dimension. For example,
questions including whether the patent system benefits software consumers (6/
24/14), student loan interest rates (8/8/2013), the efficacy of sanctions on Russia
(3/25/2014), and the effects of taxing soft drinks (8/7/2012) were posed in ways
that do not necessarily tap underlying ideologies.13 Furthermore, some questions
that might be expected to elicit ideology fail to do so because of question wording.14
Given that the survey was not designed to elicit ideology, these and other factors
likely add substantial noise.
In order to test whether these results were sensitive to the specification em-
ployed, we varied the rules described in the previous section in three ways. First,
we raised the response rate threshold from 60 percent to 80 percent (that is, included
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only participants who answered 80 percent or more of items in each wave); we
lose data, but the cross-method correlation in scores for the remaining respondents
is above .99. Second, we treated “no opinion” responses as missing and imputed
rather than combining “no opinion” and “uncertain”; the cross-method correlation
is above .98. Finally, we imputed missing data with random values, rather than the
mean opinion; correlations ranged between .94 (wave 2) and .99 (wave 1). There-
fore, we conclude that our results are not sensitive to the particular coding rules or
imputation procedure we employed.
Interpretation of PCA Scores
We analyze the substantive meaning of the latent dimension revealed by the PCA in
two ways. First, Table 1 summarizes the top 10 items that load on this dimension
for each wave.15 This dimension reflects respondents’ beliefs about an array of
politically contested issues, such as the Obama administration’s responses to the
2008–9 financial crisis and recession, the Affordable Care Act (i.e., “Obamacare”), the
minimum wage, inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in trade deals, the
division between inflation “hawks” and “doves,” and school vouchers. Responses
on these familiar political issues line up in the expected directions; for example,
support for Obama administration policies during the recession load in a direction
opposite of support for school vouchers and skepticism regarding the benefits
of infrastructure spending. The dimension touches on microeconomic debates
over market failure as well as macroeconomic policy questions. For example,
supporters of the Obama policies are more likely to agree that the online retailer
amazon.com (which at the time of the survey was involved in a dispute with a
publisher over e-book prices) used its market share to affect supply. This implies
a correlation between micro- and macroeconomic beliefs, notably tendency to
perceive market distortions (even in niche markets) and support for interventionist
policies. Similarly, supporters of school vouchers are more likely to believe that laws
regulating ticket scalping hurt consumers and to oppose price-gouging regulations
during weather emergencies.
These cross-issue correlations imply an ideologically consistent issue dimension
running from supporters of recent episodes of state intervention who tend to
perceive market failures, to respondents who oppose policy interventions and
are suspicious of market failure arguments. By ideology, we simply mean that
the substantive meaning of this latent dimension corresponds to a familiar set of
debates over the proper role of government and the ability of unregulated markets
to achieve efficiency and equity. We do not equate the terms “ideological” and
“normative”; ideological positions in general can be understood as ontological
beliefs about the nature of reality rather than values (Martin and Desmond 2010).
For example, the belief that “government intervention is generally inefficient” both
has ideological content and reflects ontological beliefs that can be grounded in
evidence and research. Our argument is about the alignment of beliefs that relates
to the proper role of government intervention and markets and not to the underlying
origin of these beliefs.
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Table 1: IGM panel items related to latent ideology.
Date Topic Belief implied by “agree” response
Wave 1
2/26/2013 Minimum Wage Raising minimum wage is desirable. (–)
11/13/2012 Bailouts: Banks and Automakers 2009 automaker bailouts were beneficial.(–)
10/17/2011 Education School vouchers improve educational quality. (+)
5/23/2013 Infrastructure Public infrastructure spending has low returns. (+)
2/15/2012 Economic Stimulus 2009 fiscal stimulus was beneficial. (–)
7/3/2012 Europe Germany should not demand labor reforms and aus-
terity in exchange for bailouts of Southern Europe.(–)
3/27/2013 Trade Deals Trade deals should not include labor and environ-
mental rules. (+)
11/13/2012 Bailouts: Banks and Automakers 2008 Bank bailouts were beneficial.(–)
4/16/2012 Ticket Resale Ticket scalping laws hurt consumers. (+)
5/2/2012 Price Gouging Government should prevent price gouging during
weather emergencies.(–)
Wave 2
4/7/2015 Raising Interest Rates Federal Reserve should not preemptively raise inter-
est rates.(–)
12/8/2015 U.S. Interest Rates Federal Reserve should have raised interest rates
earlier. (+)
11/20/2015 Quarterly Earnings Annual (rather than quarterly) earnings reports
would allow executives to concentrate on the longer-
run.(–)
11/20/2015 Quarterly Earnings Annual (rather than quarterly) earnings reports
would benefit shareholders(–).
2/15/2012 Economic Stimulus 2009 fiscal stimulus was beneficial.(–)
10/5/2015 Health Insurance Subsidies Benefits of Affordable Care Act will exceed costs.(–)
9/22/2015 $15 Minimum Wage Raising minimum wage to $15/hour will increase
unemployment. (+)
9/22/2015 $15 Minimum Wage Raising minimum wage to $15/hour will increase
GDP.(–)
11/13/2012 Bailouts: Banks and Automakers 2009 automaker bailouts were beneficial.(–)
10/28/2014 Amazon and Market Power Amazon.com uses market power to reduce book
supply.(–)
Notes: Sign indicates direction of the item’s influence on PCA dimension 1; positive weights imply
more pro-market positions. Beliefs are summaries of survey items; full item wording can be found at
http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel using the question topics and dates reported in
the table. Questions on automaker bailouts and economic stimulus appear in both survey waves because
respondents joining the panel in the second wave were asked these questions retroactively.
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Table 2: Linear models of respondents’ latent ideology.
PCA dimension 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Right 2.339† 2.141∗ 2.131† 2.097∗ 2.290†
(0.895) (0.762) (0.894) (0.770) (0.903)
Left −1.110 −0.863 −1.381 −1.727† −1.154
(0.734) (0.627) (0.747) (0.696) (0.870)
Saltwater dept. faculty −1.975∗ −1.649∗ −1.607∗
(0.467) (0.481) (0.514)
Saltwater dept. graduate 0.859
(0.581)
Female 0.083 −0.634 −0.116
(0.783) (0.609) (0.702)
Foreign born −0.935 −0.856 −0.994
(0.660) (0.562) (0.682)
Professional age −0.020 −0.026 −0.031
(0.030) (0.023) (0.025)
Private sector exp. 0.660 1.087† 0.836
(0.673) (0.522) (0.717)
Central bank exp. 1.223 0.861 0.494
(0.743) (0.589) (0.685)
Macro 0.779
(0.639)
International −0.891
(1.028)
Finance 0.493
(0.861)
Labor −0.331
(0.668)
Public Finance −0.433
(0.640)
Industrial organization 0.172
(0.726)
Constant −0.059 0.928† −0.539 0.364 1.509 1.539
(0.320) (0.359) (0.453) (1.014) (0.808) (1.106)
R2 0.194 0.431 0.233 0.116 0.536 0.579
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.391 0.180 0.009 0.438 0.394
Notes: OLS estimates; n = 47; † p <0.01; * p <0.05
In order to further confirm this interpretation, we pool individual’s position on
the first principal component across the two waves16 and regress them on respon-
dent’s attributes, including political affiliations and the academic departments in
which they were educated and are employed. Results are reported in Table 2. First,
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a dummy reflecting conservative political affiliations is statistically significant; the
corresponding dummy for left-leaning affiliations is not significant, though its sign
is in the expected direction.17 Second, faculty employed in “saltwater” departments
lean to the left of faculty at “freshwater” departments (comparison group). As
expected, “saltwater” employment and “left” have the same sign. In contrast, we
find no evidence that graduates of “saltwater” departments have different views
from those of other departments: the coefficient for this term is not significant, and
its sign is in the opposite of the expected direction.18 Thus, there is evidence of ideo-
logical homophily in departmental recruitment and hiring, but not that economists
are socialized through their training to adhere to the ideology that prevails in their
department.
These findings are summarized in Figure 4, which depicts position on the first
PCA dimension on the horizontal axis. Departmental and partisan affiliations
account remarkably well for the first PCA dimension: with only two exceptions,
respondents more than half a standard deviation above the mean are either faculty
at a “freshwater” department, affiliated with a right-leaning organization, or both,
while respondents more than half a standard deviation below the mean are either
faculty at a saltwater department, affiliated with a left-leaning organization, or both.
Two departmental outliers (a saltwater conservative and freshwater liberal) are
accounted for by the their partisan affiliations, leaving only two liberal respondents
in a freshwater department. Respondents with left-wing affiliations are more
evenly split between the center and the left (and hence cannot be statistically
distinguished from the center), though none fall on the right. There is a sizable
middle that includes faculty at both fresh and saltwater departments, as well as
half of respondents with left-wing affiliations (though only one right-affiliated
respondent of five falls in the center). Thus, the field is not polarized, but aligned.
Models 4 through 6 check the robustness of these results by adding control
variables. We expect female (May et al. 2014) and foreign-born (Fourcade 2009)
economists to be somewhat more interventionist, whereas older economists and
those with private sector and central banking experience may be more pro-market.
With the exception of female, coefficients are in the expected direction, though
none are significant at the .05 level. However, as model 5 shows, controlling for
these factors does not substantively change the coefficients for departmental and
partisan affiliations (if anything, controlling for this set of variables, the left group
is statistically distinguishable from the center). Adding a series of dummies for
area of expertise does not alter the basic finding. Respondents with private sector
experience (such as corporate board memberships and consulting) may hold more
conservative views, but this variable is not consistently significant.
Especially given a small sample size, these findings amount to a strong rejection
of the “consensus + noise” null hypothesis. Faculty at “freshwater” departments
take positions that are more pro-market than their saltwater colleagues; moreover,
economists with right-wing partisan affiliations are measurably to the right of their
colleagues with no affiliation and those with left-wing affiliations. As Figure 4
shows, these patterns are remarkably consistent. Thus, contrary to the claim that
there is “no evidence to support a conservative versus liberal divide” (Gordon and
Dahl 2013) or across departments in the IGM panel, we find clear evidence of ideo-
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Figure 4: PCA results. Note: Each axis is scaled to the variance explained by the corresponding PCA dimension.
Position on vertical axis is provided for visual clarity; this axis has no substantive interpretation (see text).
logical alignment on a dimension that runs from pro-market to pro-interventionist
positions.
Dyadic Analysis
Above, we argued that focusing on formal affiliation variables such as party and
department ignores important informal disciplinary social structures. In particular,
we proposed that coauthorship networks provide a means of measuring the het-
erogeneous topology of “invisible colleges,” or clusters of like-minded scholars. In
this section, we test whether respondents with similar social networks also share
similar ideologies. Results are reported in Table 3.
In order to model the relationship between network similarity and ideological
distance, we begin with a baseline specification that includes two measures of
network size as well as our main network variable, the Jaccard similarity index.
Because higher-order network measures are frequently sensitive to network size, it
is often necessary to include separate covariates to net out these lower-order effects.
In this case, although the denominator of the Jaccard index standardizes the joint
size of a dyad’s network by dividing by the total number of coauthors of each pair,
this does not eliminate the correlation between this index and our measure of joint
network size. Moreover, this standardization does not account for an important
feature of our data: namely, the fact that some respondents coauthor with other
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Table 3: Linear model of dyadic difference in latent ideology.
Absolute distance on PCA dimension 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network equivalence −2.870 −4.663 −4.441 −3.974
(0.033)∗ (0.001)† (0.001)† (0.009)†
Joint network size −0.051 −0.055 −0.055 −0.041
(0.180) (0.147) (0.138) (0.279)
Joint panel coauthors 0.374 0.346 0.346 0.341
(0.029)∗ (0.029)∗ (0.039)∗ (0.043)∗
Expertise overlap 0.415 0.400 0.374
(0.006)† (0.010)† (0.012)∗
Both party-neutral 0.005 −0.018
(0.982) (0.942)
Both right −1.076 −1.143
(0.150) (0.106)
Both left −0.725 −0.663
(0.151) (0.181)
Different party 1.065 1.053
(0.004)† (0.006)†
Salt-fresh 0.666
(0.015)∗
Intercept 2.567 2.531 2.521 1.861
(0.000)† (0.000)† (0.000)† (0.001)†
R2 0.037 0.061 0.083 0.107
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.057 0.076 0.100
Notes: Two-sided quadratic assignment procedure p-values in parentheses; n = 1,081; † p <0.01; * p <0.05.
members of the IGM panel, while others do not. Examination of the correlation
matrix among these variables shows that although both size measures (total joint
degree and joint within-survey coauthors) are positively correlated with the Jaccard
index, they have opposite correlations with ideological distance. Because of this
pattern of correlations, it is necessary to control both size variables in order to isolate
the relationship between network similarity and ideological distance.
Model 1 shows this pattern: network similarity is significantly and negatively as-
sociated with ideological distance,19 whereas the dyadic mean number of coauthors—
that is, the extent to which a pair tends to coauthor with other respondents—is
significantly and positively related to distance. Although our interpretation of this
latter effect is tentative, it suggests that the choice of panel members as coauthors
differs systematically from their non-panel coauthors, possibly reflecting the fact
that panelists were selected on the basis of their high status and visibility in the
profession, whereas their coauthors (on average) are likely to be lower status and
less well-known. In particular, high-status opinion leaders within the profession
may have clearer ideological positions than their less visible colleagues. Were this
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the case, the decision to collaborate with other panelists carries greater information
about any focal economist’s own ideological position, which would explain the
positive association we observe.
However, our main interest is in the negative relationship between network
similarity and ideological distance. This coefficient implies that respondents with
more similar social networks are also more ideologically similar. Results are similar
using an alternative (correlation-based) measure of structural equivalence and a
proximity-based model that includes indicators for direct and indirect ties.20 In
order to check for possible omitted variables, we first introduce a measure of shared
expertise. Although none of the controls for expertise were significant in the OLS
models above, because economists are more likely to coauthor if they share inter-
ests, it is possible that the association between network similarity and ideological
distance reflects shared expertise rather than the effects of social networks per se.
To account for this, we add an indicator for the number of shared areas of expertise
(as measured by NBER memberships) in model 2. Not only is the network effect
robust to this control, it increases substantially. At the same time—surprisingly—
respondents with more similar interests are actually further apart in ideological
space than those with no overlapping interests. We interpret this unexpected pos-
itive association as a design effect due to the composition of the IGM panel. The
survey designers chose respondents to achieve variation on substantive expertise
as well as political leanings. The positive relationship between expertise overlap
and ideological distance suggests that panel selection followed a tacit “Noah’s
ark” approach, in which designers selected respondents of the same “species” on
opposite sides of the ideological divide.
Models 3 and 4 add joint political and departmental affiliations to the dyadic
model in order to test whether network similarity is a reflection of the effects re-
ported above. Controls are consistent with the results reported in Table 2 above, but
network similarity continues to have a strong negative association with ideological
distance after controlling for these variables. Similarly, a control for dyads split
across freshwater and saltwater departments is significant but does not alter the
substantive import of network similarity. Thus, this relationship is robust to the
party and departmental effects observed in Table 2.
Thus, the more similar the informal social networks of economists, the more
similar the latent ideology of their policy views. We are not suggesting that informal
disciplinary structures are an exogenous cause of ideological positions. It is equally
likely that the opposite is the case: economists choose their coauthors on the basis
of their compatibility on several dimensions, including ideology. Thus, two of
our main findings are probably explained at least in part by social homophily:
ideologically like-minded economists tend to hire one another as colleagues and
choose the same coauthors. However, more complex feedback processes may
also be involved: for example, a right-leaning department is more likely to hire a
right-leaning colleague, but frequent interaction post-hire also reinforces existing
dispositions, accentuating differences across departments, parties, and coauthor
clusters. Our goal in this article is not to sort through such complex processes but
rather to demonstrate that ideological heterogeneity is both real and consistently
related to informal social structure as well as formal affiliation.
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Conclusions
Prior published research on the IGM panel has emphasized consensus in the eco-
nomics profession; this conclusion has had ample repercussion in public debate.
We bracket the question of measuring consensus—which we argue is difficult to
address without comparative data and is highly contingent on the survey instru-
ment employed—and focus instead on issue alignment. Our findings falsify the
null hypothesis of “consensus + noise” in favor of the alignment model. Although
there is undoubtedly consensus on many issues in the economics profession, this
does not imply that the remaining variation is purely “idiosyncratic” white noise,
or that professional opinion is devoid of ideology. Rather, using more data and
methods better suited to this question, we identify a consistent ideological dimen-
sion in economists’ beliefs; this ideological dimension touches on some of the most
pressing public policy issues addressed by the survey. In short, professional opinion
is more constrained—in the sense of alignment of opinion across beliefs—than the
“consensus + noise” null hypothesis implies; furthermore, this organization of belief
is clearly related to partisanship, to department, and to the informal social structure
of the discipline.
Some observers may find the fact that economists are ideologically heteroge-
neous unsurprising. However, recent literature has argued otherwise, and we know
of no other study to identify latent ideology in the economics profession using
survey data. More fundamentally, it is important to underscore that we identify
this heterogeneity within the narrow mainstream elite represented by faculty at the
top seven departments. Many critics of mainstream economics assume that the free
market/interventionist divide within economics is mainly a contrast between an
“orthodox” mainstream and heterodox dissenters from the “neoclassical” consensus.
Our findings show that the state/market rift exists within the mainstream, not just
between the mainstream and periphery of the discipline. Critics might argue that
the mainstream “interventionists” identified by our analysis are still fundamentally
“free market” (relative to their own point of reference).21 We suggest that empirical
analysis of the economics discipline is more fruitfully guided by understanding this
as an instance of the fractal character of disciplinary social structure (Abbott 2001)
and the constitutive misunderstandings that this entails (for a discussion, see Van
Gunten 2015).
Some analysis of consensus in the economics discipline appears motivated, if
tacitly, by the assumption that where professionals hold a broad consensus, this
consensus should inform public policy. Although the recent academic literature on
professional consensus is circumspect, popular discussions of the IGM survey in
particular make this point explicit (Stevenson and Wolfers 2012). One implication
of our findings is that consumers of economic expertise must exercise healthy skep-
ticism faced with the claim that professional opinion is free of political ideology.
Conversely, however, we also emphasize that language of professional “polariza-
tion” and “factions” is overblown. Professional belief is aligned on a subset of
ideologically freighted items, but not polarized: one implication of this is that there
is a substantial center.
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Finally, our finding that ideological proximity is associated with informal net-
work similarity shows that ideology is not just a correlate of formal organizational
structures but also plays some role in economists’ research activities. Our tentative
working hypothesis is that the association between network similarity and ideologi-
cal proximity reflects homophily in coauthor selection (and possibly self-reinforcing
processes). If true, this implies that economists choose ideologically similar coau-
thors as research partners, which may limit the range of hypotheses, interpretations,
and implications they consider. In this sense, our results support the finding of
Jelveh et al. (2014) that latent ideology is present in published research. Again, our
goal is not to denounce economics as an inherently ideologically driven enterprise
but rather encourage healthy skepticism in the consumption of economic expertise.
Notes
1 We do not mean to suggest that holding beliefs on this dimension means that the
research produced by economists is necessarily biased, only that their policy beliefs
reflect dispositions substantively related to political debates.
2 Polarization or consensus within the professional mainstream is distinct from divisions
between this mainstream and the professional periphery or “heterodoxy.” See Dequech
(2007) for a discussion of the distinction between “mainstream,” “orthodox,” and “hetero-
dox” economics. Although drawing boundaries around the “mainstream” is empirically
challenging, in this article, we study the less ambiguous mainstream elite.
3 We call this epiphenomenal because, conditional on one’s placement in one of the two
great groups, the items are independent.
4 The survey remains active at the time of writing; our analysis is based on data collected
through May 2016. Data are available at www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-
panel.
5 This introduces a limited amount of redundancy because some responses are used twice
but enables us to use all the available data. However, we exclude items that were
“revisited” by the panel and answered by the replenishment respondents (i.e., the same
question was asked twice), because these items are redundant.
6 We also include two respondents whose response rate was 59 percent. The average
individual response rate is 75 percent.
7 Our analysis codes “(dis)agree” and “strongly (dis)agree” as (negative) 1 and 1.5 and
collapses “uncertain” and “no opinion” into a single neutral response coded zero.
8 We pool partisan and think tank affiliations in order to maximize the available informa-
tion about respondents’ political memberships. Whereas ten respondents held positions
in a Democratic administration, only two respondents held positions under Republi-
can administrations (one of whom we must drop due to nonresponse). However, one
respondent is affiliated with the conservative American Enterprise Institute, and four
are senior fellows at the Hoover Institution. Although Hoover is officially nonpartisan,
surveys of congressional staff and journalists class the institution as conservative (Rich
2005). We only include senior fellows, because short-term visiting fellowships may not
reflect ideological alignment with the organization’s mission. See below for additional
validation of this assumption.
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9 Although Yale and Princeton are not always identified as clearly fresh or salty, Önder
and Terviö (2015) rank Yale as fresher than Chicago, whereas Princeton is the second
saltiest department.
10 We impute substantive expertise to the few respondents that are not NBER members
based on their publications and stated specialization. Unlike Gordon and Dahl, however,
we account for the fact that economists have more than one area of expertise by coding
the dummy for each broad interest area as one if the respondent is a member of any of
the corresponding NBER programs.
11 In other words, these measures are defined as
√
di × dj, where d = the degree measure
in question.
12 Specifically, each iteration of this test randomly permutes the observed responses on
each item across respondents and then runs the PCA on the randomized data. We then
compute the number of iterations (out of 1,000) in which we achieved a level of explained
variance greater or equal to the observed data.
13 For example, although beliefs regarding taxation of soft drinks might be ideologically
inflected, this survey item asked whether such taxes were likely to result in substitution
for other forms of calories. Ideological opposition to taxes on sugar might not depend on
this belief about consumer behavior.
14 For example, the survey’s first item (9/29/11) asked whether Federal Reserve policies
would increase GDP growth “by at least one percentage point”—an extremely large effect
for monetary policy. In comments, several respondents indicated that they expected an
effect, but not on the order of 1 percent.
15 Two items appear twice because they were among the items posed retroactively to the
replenishment respondents.
16 Because respondents’ first dimension scores from the two waves are highly correlated,
we combine them by standardizing scores and using either the score from their one
active wave or (when possible) an average of the two.
17 We also find that, in a model that includes separate dummies for each of the three types
of conservative affiliation (Republican administration, American Enterprise Institute,
and Hoover) as well as for affiliations with Democratic administrations, the Hoover
dummy is statistically significant, and all coefficients have their expected signs. Thus,
there is strong support for classing Hoover as a conservative affiliation and pooling these
terms.
18 Because respondents graduated from a wider range of departments than those in which
they are employed, we explored a variety of alternative specifications, all of which
yielded similar results.
19 To be clear, the implication of the preceding paragraph is that a two-tailed test of this
relationship is not statistically significant in the absence of the control for within-survey
coauthors, though a one-tailed test is significant at the 0.05 level, with the expected sign,
in the simple bivariate model.
20 Network theorists distinguish between structural equivalence and cohesion (i.e., proxim-
ity) measures; however, when indirect ties are taken into account, these measures are
usually highly correlated (Mizruchi 1993), as they are in these data. Thus, we do not
attempt to distinguish between equivalence and proximity, as our argument is applicable
to both.
21 Conversely, Austrian (i.e., libertarian) economists have tried to show that mainstream
economics is not “free market” by conducting surveys heavily skewed towards “litmus
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test” questions around support for regulation in markets for drugs, gambling, and
prostitution (Klein and Stern 2007).
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